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We start by laying out some stylized facts on regional growth in Europe from 1960 onwards 
(Section 2). On this basis we proceed in Section 3 to an econometric analysis on how these 
facts can be explained, allowing for a broad range of causal factors as well as the possibility 
that the dynamics differ across various types of regional ‘clubs’. Section 4 broadens the 
analysis by taking into account the possible impact of changes in EU regional support in the 
last decade. Finally, in Section 5 we return to the questions of what all this has to say for 
regional convergence in Europe in the future, what the lessons for policy are and how the 











                                                 
1  Paper prepared for presentation at the EAEPE 1999 conference in Prague. A version of the paper is 
forthcoming in Fagerberg, J., P. Guerrieri and B. Verspagen (eds.) The Economic Challenge for 
Europe: Adapting to Innovation-based Growth, to be published by Edward Elgar.   1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Greater equality across Europe in productivity and income has been one of the central goals 
for the European Community since the early days of European economic integration. And for 
a long time this was achieved. As shown by several studies
1 differences in GDP per capita 
between European regions declined steadily from the early 1950s onwards. However, more 
recently this process seems to have slowed down considerably, and perhaps come to a 
complete halt (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996).  
  What are the reasons behind these developments? Economic analyses of differences in 
growth across countries or regions have been based on two competing perspectives. The first, 
based on the traditional neoclassical theory of economic growth (Solow, 1956), is based on 
the assumption that technology is a public good, available to anyone free of charge. This 
perspective puts the emphasis on capital accumulation as the main vehicle for reducing 
differences in productivity across countries or regions. Moreover, this is assumed to happen 
more or less automatically, as long as markets are allowed to work freely. The other, 
competing, perspective puts the main emphasis on innovation and diffusion of technology as 
the driving force behind differences in growth. This perspective is based on a totally different 
view on technology, emphasizing its public as well as private character, and the 
complementarity between technology and other factors that take part in the growth process. 
Technological know-how is described as a rather local affair, embedded in firms, 
organizations, networks and so on, dependent on specific assets of various types that are not 
easily forthcoming. This leads to the hypothesis that without the ability to develop such 
assets, countries or regions are likely to fall behind rather than catch up.
  
  Previous research has shown that the predictions of the public good model do not fit 
regional growth very well (see, for instance, Sala-i-Martin, 1996) and that a more 
comprehensive framework, taking into account a wider range of factors, is necessary in order 
to accommodate the facts. This is what we wish to do in this chapter for the European case. 
We start in Section 2 by laying out some stylized facts on regional growth in Europe from 
1960 onwards. On this basis we proceed in Section 3 to an econometric analysis on how these 
facts can be explained, allowing for a broad range of causal factors as well as the possibility 
that the dynamics differ across various types of regional ‘clubs’. Section 4 broadens the 
analysis by taking into account the possible impact of changes in EU regional support in the 
last decade. Finally, in Section 5 we return to the questions of what all this has to say for 
regional convergence in Europe in the future, what the lessons for policy are and how the 
future research agenda in this area should look like.  
 
2 REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN EUROPE: THE STYLIZED FACTS 
 
In this section we take a fresh look at regional disparities in GDP per capita in EU countries. 
We extend the data to the most recent ones available (1995) at the time of writing. For all 
countries except the most recent members of the EU (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 
EUROSTAT provides data on regional income data in purchasing power standards (PPS) 
values from 1980 to 1995. We link these data with earlier data as consistently as possible in 
order to study fairly long historical series on dispersion within and between EU countries. In 
addition we provide some evidence on regional dispersion of labour productivity.   
  Our data on regional per capita GDP levels cover the period 1960 to 1995. The data for 
1960 are based on Molle (1980). The data for 1970 to 1980 are based on various issues of the 
yearbook of regional statistics from EUROSTAT. More recent data are from the REGIO 
database.
2 All data are measured in PPS (purchasing power standard). As a measure of 
dispersion, we use the standard deviation of the logarithm of regional GDP per capita.
3  
  Table 1 presents the trends for two country groupings, EU9 and EU12. The difference 
between these two is that the latter also includes the three southern countries that joined the 
Community in the 1980s; Greece, Portugal and Spain. For each grouping we present two 
measures of dispersion, regional and national standard deviation. The former measures the 
dispersion across regions in Europe, irrespective of which country the region belongs to. The 
latter measures the dispersion between country aggregates (that is, means over regions).    2 
 
Table 6.1 Dispersion of GDP per capita in EU regions and countries 1960–1995  
  1960  1970  1980  1995 
Regional standard deviation EU9  0.343  0.274  0.202  0.205 
National standard deviation EU9  0.263  0.233  0.184  0.168 








Regional standard deviation EU12      0.279  0.255 
National standard deviation EU12  0.459  0.342  0.328  0.258 
         
Share of total regional dispersion in EU9 due to:         
Between country dispersion in per cent  64  79  52  41 
Within country dispersion in per cent  36  21  48  59 
 
Note.  
All figures based on PPS. The regional disaggregation is more detailed from 1980 and onwards and this 
biases the figures before 1980 for EU9 downwards. The productivity figures for EU9 do not include 
Denmark and Ireland and are based on the NUTS-I level for most countries, as employment data at the 
NUTS-II level were not available. The share of total dispersion is based on a standard decomposition of 
the total variance of log GDP per capita in between country and within country effects. 
 
The table shows that a significant decrease in both regional and national dispersion took place 
in EU9 between 1960 and 1980. Hence, Europe appeared to be on a path towards 
convergence. After 1980, this trend continued at the national level (that is, between 
countries), although at a slower pace. The latter is not so surprising, given that the level of 
disparity was rather low already in 1980.  What is more surprising, however, is that at the 
regional level, for which the level of disparity in 1980 was much higher, convergence ceased 
after 1980. These findings are in accordance with the figures presented by Molle and 
colleagues, using a different methodology (Molle, 1980; Molle and Cappellin, 1988).
4  
  As can be seen from the table, the level of dispersion in GDP per employed person is 
lower than in GDP per capita. This implies that high-income regions are rich not only because 
they have high productivity but also because a larger share of their population is working. 
However, the change in the dispersion of GDP per employed over time is quite similar to that 
of GDP per capita. This implies that in the present context, the use of GDP per capita as a 
proxy for productivity is relatively unproblematic. 
  The larger group (EU12), including the southern entrants, deviates from the EU9 
experience by showing both regional convergence and national convergence between 1980 
and 1995. Furthermore, the reduction in national disparity (that is, between country 
aggregates) is much stronger than for EU9.  This shows that on average the three new entrants 
grew faster than original members, that is, that a process of catch-up in productivity took 
place. However, also in this case, the trend towards convergence was much stronger at the 
national level than at the regional level. 
  We thus find a clear difference between trends at the national and regional levels, with 
much less convergence at the regional level.
5 This shows that although countries in the EU at 
large are still converging to each other, not all regions benefit from this process to the same 
extent. This is also indicated by the increasing (since 1970) share of total disparity that is 
accounted for by within-country disparity in EU9, rather than between country disparity (last 
lines in Table 6.1). 
  Figure 6.1, which reports data for regional dispersion within individual member countries, 
further illustrates this pattern.
6,7 For all EU9 countries there is either little change or a 
tendency towards increased regional dispersion (notably for the UK and to some extent 
Italy
8). For the three new entrants there is a lot of variation over time, but there appears to 
have been some reduction in regional disparity in all three countries over the period as a 
whole. However, for Spain and Portugal this reduction is very small, and for Greece it took 
place prior to 1982, after which regional dispersion has been slowly increasing.  Hence the 
conclusion seems to be that there has been very little convergence between regions within 
individual EU member countries since the early 1980s.   3 
 
(Figure 6.1 about here) 
   
The evidence brought forward in this section confirms that the process towards convergence 
in GDP per capita (or productivity) across European regions has indeed slowed down in 
recent years. However, this is not caused by diverging trends between EU countries. In fact, at 
the country level there is still some evidence of convergence. This applies in particular to the 
southern countries that entered the community in the early 1980s. Rather, this slow-down 
seems to be related to the lack of convergence – and in some cases increasing dispersion – 
between regions within most EU member countries.  
 
3 EXPLAINING REGIONAL GROWTH 
 
The finding that there is more convergence between countries than within them certainly begs 
new questions about the relationship between regional and nationwide growth. Clearly not all 
regions benefit from nationwide growth to the same extent. There are at least two central 
issues here. First, what are the factors that determine whether a region forges ahead or lags 
behind compared to the country average? Second, conditional on differences in country 
trends, are there important commonalties between regions in different countries that share 
certain basic characteristics?  Is it, for instance, the case that, say, agricultural regions have 
much in common, independent of which country they belong to? These are issues that we 
would like to explore in the following. 
  Any explanation of growth differences needs theoretical underpinning. Our point of 
departure is the ‘technology gap theory’ of growth (Fagerberg, 1987).
9 As in other theoretical 
frameworks, it is assumed that innovation, diffusion and technology fuel growth. However, 
although technological activity gives rise to positive externalities, technology is not assumed 
to be a public good in the sense that it is equally available to everybody free of charge. On the 
contrary, it is argued that successful adoption of new technology is generally costly. 
Typically, it requires a host of complementary factors of the sort that Abramovitz (1994) 
classifies under the terms ‘social capability’ and ‘technological congruence’. Hence, 
following this perspective regional growth may be seen as the outcome of three sets of 
factors: 
 
-  innovation activities in the region, 
-  the potential for exploiting technologies developed elsewhere (diffusion), and 
-  complementary factors affecting to what extent this potential is realized. 
 
There are two major problems in applying this perspective. The first has to do with finding 
indicators of innovation and the potential for diffusion, the second with identifying and 
measuring the ‘complementary factors’.
10 For innovation we use R&D intensity, defined as 
business enterprise R&D personnel as a percentage of total employment. We expect a positive 
impact of this variable. For diffusion potential we use, as customary in the literature, the 
initial level of GDP per capita in the region (log-form, 1980). The higher this level, the 
smaller the scope for imitating more advanced technologies developed elsewhere. Hence, the 
expected impact of this variable is negative. Regarding complementary factors, there are 
many candidates that can be defended theoretically, from variables related to various types of 
investments in humans (that is, education), infrastructure and physical capital to structural 
factors of various sorts. However, data are extremely scarce, especially among the former.  
   
  The ‘complementary’ variables that we were able to take into account include: 
 
-  physical infrastructure (kilometres of motorways per square kilometre), 
-  population density (the number of inhabitants per square kilometre), 
-  industrial structure (the shares of employment in agriculture and industry, respectively, in 
total employment),
11    4 
-  long-term unemployment (that is, duration of more than one year, as a share of the total 
labour force) and 
-  growth rate of the population in the region. 
 
Among these, we would expect the first two to have a positive impact on technology 
diffusion, since both a more developed infrastructure and a higher population density increase 
the profitability/reduce the cost of introducing new technology. Regarding industrial structure, 
it is one of the standard results in the existing empirical literature on regions that industrial 
structure matters. In particular, a high reliance on agriculture has been shown to be 
detrimental to regional growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996), among other things because 
of low technological opportunities, and slow growth of the market. On the share of ‘industry’ 
in total employment the expectations are less clear. Traditionally this sector – particularly 
manufacturing  – has been regarded as an ‘engine of growth’ (Kaldor, 1967). However, 
technological progress in recent decades has been more geared towards services than industry 
and many traditional industries have been characterized by slow growth. Finally we include 
the level of unemployment as a possible complementary factor. We interpret this as a measure 
of the cohesion of the broader social and economic system in the region. The higher the share 
of the labour force that is excluded from work on a long-term basis, the less well this system 
works. Hence it is an indicator of institutional failure, and as such it might be expected to 
have a negative impact on growth.
12 For instance, it may hamper inflows of risk capital and 
qualified people, and encourage outflows, as empirical research in this area indeed suggests 
(Fagerberg, Caniëls and Verspagen, 1997). Long-term unemployment also leads to 
deprecation of skills and lack of learning by doing in parts of the workforce. In preliminary 
estimations we also included population growth, but it never had any significance, and was 
consequently dropped. All explanatory variables included in the regressions are for 1985, 
except unemployment, which due to data availability refers to 1987.  The dependent variable, 
growth of GDP per capita, is the mean growth rate over the years 1980–94. 
  Table 6.2 presents the results. The basic model (first column) explains about 40 per cent of 
the total variance. When country dummies are added (third column), as is customary when 
pooling regional data for different countries, the explanatory power increases quite a bit. 
Furthermore, as shown in the bottom row of the third column, an F-test suggests that these 
dummies are jointly significant. However, by inspection it turns out that most of these 
dummies are of little numerical importance. The exceptions are Spain and Portugal, of which 
the former grows significantly faster, and the latter significantly slower, than the average.  
  The results support the basic hypothesis of our approach. Both innovation (R&D) and a 
large potential for diffusion contribute positively to regional growth when the impact of other, 
conditioning factors is taken into account. Among the latter, all but physical infrastructure 
receive some support. The evidence suggests that a high reliance on agriculture hampers 
growth, as does a high share of the workforce in industry. Hence, the regions that have been 
able to exploit the potential for diffusion to the fullest extent, are those that are specialized in 
services. This is consistent with the view that the effects of the ICT revolution have been 
more widespread in services than in other areas. For the two remaining conditioning 
variables, population density and unemployment, the results do to some extent depend on 
whether country dummies are included or not. Although the signs are as expected in both 
cases, the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero in the latter case. 
This is especially evident in the case of unemployment. The latter has to do with the fact that 
long-term unemployment is especially high in Spain. Since Spain is a fast-growing country 
despite these problems, the variable loses its explanatory power when country-specific effects 
are not included.  
  The second question we wish to address is the extent to which regions differ according to 
other criteria that may cut across country borders. Is it, for instance, the case that the 
dynamics of, say, regions with high unemployment differ from that of other regions in 
important respects? We test this using a method developed by Durlauf and Johnson (1992), 
and subsequently applied by two of us on European growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996). 
The method consists of sorting the observations in increasing (or decreasing) order of a 
control variable, splitting the sample at each observation j and run two separate regressions   5 
for the first j observations and the last n-j observations (where n is the total number of 
observations). The final step is to pick the combination of control variable and j that yields the 
highest explanatory power.
13 As control variables we include all the explanatory variables in 
our model and, in addition, a variable reflecting the location of the region on a north–south 
axis (longitude).
14 The latter is introduced to test for the commonly held view (see, for 
instance, Neven and Goyette, 1995) that there is a clear division between the dynamics in the 
north and south of Europe. 
 
 
Table 6.2 Basic results. One or several growth clubs? 
 
Variables  Model 
(A) 
t-stat.   Model 
(B) 
t-stat.  Test for split 
(A) 
F(7,91)  
Test for split 
(B) 
F(7,82) 
Longitude          2.02  1.86 
Constant   0.1954   (6.17)   0.2386   (4.88)      
GDP per capita  -0.0432   (5.43)   -0.0535   (4.25)   2.56(**)  1.95 
Agriculture  -0.0375   (4.25)   -0.0398   (3.99)   3.49(*)   2.53(**) 
Industry  -0.0358   (3.71)   -0.0386   (4.10)   2.77(**)  2.45(**) 
Infrastructure   0.0001   (0.55)    0.0003   (0.84)   1.87  1.86 
Unemployment  -0.0002   (1.05)   -0.0010   (3.54)   4.52(*)  2.15(**) 
Population density   0.0006   (0.91)    0.0017   (1.96)   2.35(**)  1.62 
R&D   0.0027   (1.54)    0.0038   (2.73)   3.47(*)  3.97(*) 
Belgium      -0.0009   (0.36)      
Germany      -0.0003   (0.13)      
Greece      -0.0025   (0.67)      
Spain       0.0084   (4.01)      
France      -0.0012   (0.74)      
Italy       0.0025   (1.42)      
Netherlands      -0.0027   (0.82)      
Portugal      -0.0072    (1.98)     





   0.55 
(0.47) 
     
N  106    106       
Test for inclusion of dummies 
F(9. 98) 
     
3.29 
(*) 
     
 
Note.  
Absolute, heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics in brackets. One and two stars denote 
significance of F-test at the 1 and 5 per cent level, respectively. R2 in brackets adjusted for 
degrees of freedom. 
 
The two last columns in Table 6.2 report F-tests for the significance of these splits, the first 
without – and the second with – country dummies included in the regression. The results are 
broadly the same, although – as could be expected – there is more evidence in favour of splits 
when country-specific effects are not allowed for. In both cases the results suggest that the 
splits based on geography (longitude) and infrastructure do not lead to a significant rise in the 
explanatory power of the model. Hence there is very little support in the data for a simple 
north–south dichotomy.  Rather the results point to a more complex pattern. In both cases the 
most significant splits are those based on structural factors (agriculture and industry), 
unemployment and R&D. Among these the split based on unemployment is much less 
significant when country-specific factors are allowed, for reasons just discussed (the Spain-
effect). In fact, the only split that is supported at the one per cent level of significance in both 
cases is the one based on R&D.   6 
  Table 6.3 gives some of the characteristics of the most significant regional groupings 
(variable means). It turns out that there are important similarities between the splits based on 
R&D, agriculture and industry. In all three cases, we get a split between a small, high-
productivity group (20–30 regions) and a larger group with more average/low levels of 
productivity. The smaller group also has a different industrial structure, with a much more 
prominent role for services, and a very small agricultural sector. Moreover, these regions also 
have better infrastructure, higher population density, less unemployment and – above all – 
much higher investments in R&D. They also tend to be more ‘northern’, although this is not a 
defining characteristic in itself, as noted above.  
   
Table 6.3 Characteristics of ‘regional clubs’ 
 
  R&D  Agriculture  Industry  Unemployment 
Split  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  Low 
                 
Number of regions  29  76  85  20  27  78  31  74 
Productivity growth   0.014   0.016   0.015   0.017   0.013   0.017   0.018   0.015  
Population growth  0.004   0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003   0.003  
Average longitude  49   43   43   50   47   44   42   46  
GDP per capita  8322   5791   6152   7923   7526   6131   5502   6903  
Agriculture  0.05   0.18   0.17   0.02   0.07   0.17   0.15   0.14  
Industry  0.33   0.29   0.29   0.32   0.40   0.26   0.27   0.31  
Services  0.61   0.53   0.53   0.66   0.53   0.56   0.57   0.55  
Investment  0.17   0.23   0.23   0.13   0.20   0.21   0.22   0.20  
Infrastructure  3.67   1.15   1.32   4.08   2.62   1.58   1.43   2.02  
Unemployment  4.83   6.74   6.05   6.89   5.33   6.52   11.11   4.16  
Population density  0.62   0.18   0.13   1.05   0.21   0.34   0.47   0.23  
R&D  0.93   0.14   0.27   0.77   0.60   0.28   0.15   0.45  
                 
Country composition:                 
Belgium  0.07   0.01   0.00   0.15   0.00   0.04   0.06   0.01  
Germany  0.28   0.03   0.05   0.30   0.26   0.04   0.00   0.14  
Greece  0.00   0.17   0.14   0.05   0.00   0.17   0.00   0.18  
Spain  0.03   0.22   0.19   0.10   0.15   0.18   0.58   0.00  
France  0.28   0.17   0.24   0.05   0.30   0.17   0.03   0.27  
Italy  0.07   0.24   0.24   0.00   0.15   0.21   0.26   0.16  
Netherlands  0.14   0.00   0.05   0.00   0.04   0.04   0.00   0.05  
Portugal  0.00   0.07   0.06   0.00   0.04   0.05   0.00   0.07  
UK  0.14   0.09   0.05   0.35   0.07   0.12   0.06   0.12  
 
Table 6.4 reports the working of the model for these regional groupings. In most cases the 
difference in the estimated coefficient for the same variable across the two subsamples of the 
split is small and not significant. The main exception is for R&D, for which it is positive and 
significant for the smaller groups, but negative (and significant in two out of three cases) in 
the larger ones. Thus, while R&D may be an important factor behind differences in growth 
performance among advanced regions, and between advanced and less advanced regions, it 
does not seem to be a very efficient tool for regions below a certain threshold of development. 
This certainly begs new questions about the creation of technological capabilities in such   7 
regions.
15 The other exception is for industry. Although the impact of specialization in 
industry is negative for all regional groupings, the estimated impact is much stronger in the 
larger groups. Hence the regions with low productivity, little R&D, a high share of total 
employment in agriculture and so on (in short, the less advanced regions) experience the 
largest negative growth impulse from industry. 
 
Table 6.4 Explaining regional growth, ‘regional clubs’ 
 






















N  29  76  85  20  27  78  31  74 



































































































































(0.56)  0.63 
 
(0.52)  0.63 
 





Absolute, heteroscedasticity consistent t-statistics in brackets. One star denotes significance 
of Wald-test for difference in coefficients across the two subsamples at the 1 per cent level, 
respectively.  R2 in brackets is adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
 
The split based on unemployment is to some extent different from the three other splits (Table 
6.3). Again, there is a small group and a larger one, but in this case the regions in the small 
group are high unemployment regions, of which more than one-half are Spanish. Among the 
remaining, the majority are Italian. On average these regions have low productivity, little 
R&D, bad infrastructure and a large agricultural sector, as is typical for many ‘peripheral’ 
regions.  In this case, the only significant difference between the two groups relates to the 
impact of unemployment on growth, which happens to be much more manifest in the low 
unemployment regions. However, since this result seems to depend very much on 
observations from one country (Spain), it is difficult to draw strong conclusions on this basis. 
We return to this issue in the next section. 
  The findings in this section support the view that innovation and diffusion of technology 
are important factors behind regional growth. But innovative efforts in the form of   8 
investments in R&D appear to be most efficient in advanced regions. In fact, in 
technologically less advanced regions, for example regions that do little R&D themselves, 
there is no evidence suggesting that regions that do more R&D than others fare any better in 
terms of growth. However, the results confirm that less advanced regions are faced with a 
considerable potential for growth through exploitation of more advanced technologies 
developed elsewhere. But the evidence suggests that this potential is seldom fully exploited 
because of counteracting factors such as, for instance, structural problems (a high reliance on 
agriculture and other traditional industries) and problems related to social and institutional 
failure (as reflected in the levels of long-term unemployment).  In general, these counteracting 
factors appear to exist in combination, indicating that the disadvantages of ‘backwardness’ are 
complex and interrelated, and cannot be reduced to a single dimension such as, for instance, 
the location of a region on a north–south axis. 
 
4 THE IMPACT OF EU REGIONAL SUPPORT 
 
In recent years EU Structural Funds have been reformed and their funding has increased 
significantly. The purpose has been to make them more effective in reducing the gap between 
the more and less advanced regions and strengthening economic and social cohesion in the 
European Community.
16 Following the 1988 reform, the financial resources allocated to these 
funds have doubled in real terms. The extent to which these funds have contributed to 
regional convergence in the EU is not addressed directly in our analysis. One reason for not 
splitting our sample in two, and analysing growth during 1980–87 and 1988–94 separately, is 
that we believe these periods are too short for explaining long-term growth. In fact, most of 
the recent empirical growth literature has used longer time periods than we have. Thus to 
estimate the effects on long-term growth rates or income levels for that matter, of increased 
regional support, seems premature at this stage. One would run the danger of mixing a short-
run Keynesian demand effect of higher transfers with the long-term supply effect. 
  It is worth noting, however, that the criteria used by the Structural Funds when allocating 
resources to different regions are to a large extent reflected in our analysis. The so-called 
Objective 1 regions are those which are characterized by low levels of GDP per capita, a large 
agricultural sector, a poorly developed infrastructure and high long-term unemployment. The 
Objective 2 regions are those affected by industrial decline. Objective 3 regions are those with 
long-term unemployment problems for people over 25 years, while Objective 4 is concerned 
with the integration of young people into working life. Funds for Objective 5 regions are 
partly related to agriculture and partly to rural development. Table 6.5 provides a breakdown 
of the Structural Funds by country and Objective.
17 
 
Table 6.5 Structural Funds by country and objective, 1989–1993.  
(ECU mn) 
      
Country  Obj. 1  Obj. 2  Obj. 3,4  Obj. 5  Total  Share of GDP 
Belgium   -   214    344    182    740  0.1 
Denmark  -     25    171     206    402  0.1 
Germany  2955    581  1054  1425  6015  0.1 
Greece  7528  -  -  -    7528  2.7 
Spain    10171  1506    837    586  13100  0.7 
France     957  1225  1442  2283    5907  0.1 
Ireland  4460  -  -  -    4460  2.7 
Italy  8504     387   903    959  10753  0.3 
Luxembourg  -      12    11      32         55  0.2 
Netherlands  -     165  405    155       725  0.1 
Portugal  8450  -  -  -     8450  3.1 
UK     793  2015  1502    506     4816  0.1 
EUR12  43818  6130  6669  6334  62951  0.3 
     
Source: EC (1996, Tables 24 and 25).             
   9 
As can be seen from the table, support from the Structural Funds is small in most EU 
countries. On average it amounts to 0.3 per cent of GDP. There are only three countries for 
which such support really matters on a national scale: Greece, Ireland and Portugal. For these 
countries the total support from the funds amounts to roughly 3 per cent of annual GDP in 
each country per year.  The regions that receive support in these countries all fall under 
Objective 1 (the poorest regions). Spain also receives an above average share (0.7 per cent), 
most of which also falls under Objective 1. 
  If regional support from the EU leads to significantly higher growth in the supported 
regions, our analysis may be biased, because we omitted an important factor affecting 
regional growth. There are two possible effects that such support might have on our analysis. 
First, in the countries for which such support is widespread, it may show up in nationwide 
growth, that is, in the estimated country- specific factors. However, by inspection it turns out 
that the two countries in our sample that have received such support on a substantial scale, 
Greece and Portugal, both receive a negative contribution from the country-specific factor. 
Hence, although a positive effect on the national level is a theoretical possibility, it is not 
something that appears to be reflected in our data. 
  The other possible effect implies that the estimates obtained on variables that are also 
Objective 1 criteria may be biased. For instance, our analysis suggests that poor regions may 
grow rapidly through imitation of more advanced technologies developed elsewhere. But the 
reality could be that these regions grow fast because they get regional support! If so, we 
would be likely to overestimate the contribution from the potential for catch-up. Or take 
agricultural regions, which are also supported. Failing to take into account the support to 
agricultural regions might lead us to underestimate the negative effect on growth of a large 
agricultural sector.  However, the results obtained from splitting the sample (Tables 6.3–6.4) 
show that there is no significant difference between the estimates obtained for these two 
variables in the two subgroups of the split(s). Thus it appears that in these cases the 
hypothesis of a bias, although possible in theory, is not of great practical relevance. This may 
be different, though, for long-term unemployment (which is, as mentioned, also one of the 
Objective 1 criteria) in the split based on that variable. In this case we got a significantly 
smaller negative effect of unemployment among high unemployment regions, consistent with 
the assumption of a downward bias in the estimate. Hence, it is possible that by failing to take 
into account various types of support that prop up growth in high unemployment areas,
18 we 
have underestimated somewhat the negative impact that unemployment has on growth in 
these regions.  
  Another way to look at this issue would be to investigate what happened to regional 
dispersion within countries in the last decades. The assumption, then, would be that countries 
that have attracted a lot of regional support, should be more likely than others to converge 
internally. Most of the Objective 1 regions, that receive the lion’s share of the support, are 
located in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and southern Italy. When we look at the regional 
dispersion within EU countries, cf. Figures 6.1 and 6.2, it becomes clear that neither within 
Greece nor Italy has increased regional support through the Structural Funds prevented 
regional dispersion from increasing. There is also no change in the trend after 1988 for these 
countries. For Portugal and Spain, on the other hand, there is some evidence of a long-term 
decline in dispersion. But for Spain there is no evidence of faster internal convergence after 
1988, and for Portugal data problems make it difficult to make an assessment.
19 Thus, there is 
no strong support in the data for the idea that increased support from the Structural Funds had 
a great impact on dispersion.  
   
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows that the level of aggregation in the empirical 
analysis matters a lot for our interpretation of growth processes. If one looks at the country 
level there appears to be a tendency towards long-run convergence in productivity and income 
levels in the European Union. However, this tendency masks important differences between 
regions within the same country. In fact, for most countries, there is either little change in 
regional dispersion, or a tendency towards divergence. This appears to happen in spite of   10 
increasing efforts at the EU level in the form of increased contributions to backward regions 
from the Structural Funds. 
   How is this to be explained? We looked at these developments from three closely related 
angles: technology, structure and institutions.  The technological perspective is based on the 
distinction between innovation and diffusion of technology. Regions at the frontier may 
receive a growth stimulus from investments in innovation activities (R&D), while backward 
regions may benefit from the adoption of new technologies at a relatively low cost. The 
evidence considered in this chapter shows that both sources are important for growth. 
However, many backward regions have failed to take advantage of the potential for diffusion. 
Lack of data prevents us from exploring many potentially relevant aspects of this, but among 
the factors that we were able to take into account, the industrial structure of the region and its 
ability to fight long-term unemployment appear to be among the most important. The 
evidence shows that, conditional on other factors, the most successful regions are those 
specialized in services and high-tech industry, while agricultural regions and those specialized 
in traditional industries are at a disadvantage. This is consistent with the view that 
technological progress in recent decades, dominated by ICT technology, has been more 
beneficial to services than to most other sectors of the economy.   
  In previous work two of us showed that, conditional on other factors, regions that receive 
support from the Structural Funds do not grow faster than other regions (Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 1996). Here, we have looked further into this issue and found that there is little 
evidence suggesting that support from the Structural Funds, including the increase in these 
funds in recent years, have had any significant effect on growth at the regional or national 
level. The findings in this chapter suggest that to achieve growth regional support schemes 
should give priority to policies that  
 
  - increase the ability of the regions to absorb new technologies, 
  - change the industrial structure (away from agriculture and traditional industries), 
  - and lead to a reduction in long-term unemployment. 
 
Why existing policies have failed to produce significant growth effects is not dealt with in 
great detail here, and will be an important topic for further research in this area. One 
hypothesis might for example be that these policies are not designed in a way that encourages 
growth, that is, do not sufficiently take into account the points made above. Another 
possibility would be that any positive effect on growth that these policies might have are 
counteracted by other polices at the EU or national level, such as, for instance, the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).   
  One factor that makes the design of regional policy difficult is that similar policies may 
have quite different consequences in different environments. This has to do with the fact that 
regions may differ not only by initial conditions, investments in R&D and physical capital 
and so on, but also in the dynamics, that is, in the impact that these variables have in the 
economy. To explore this issue we tested for possible differences in the impact of variables 
across regional subgroups defined by the three dimensions mentioned above (technological, 
structural and institutional). We also included a fourth dimension, based on a north–south 
(geographical) divide.  The results showed that a simple north–south dichotomy explains very 
little. However, what seems to be a fairly robust finding is that there exists a high R&D, high 
productivity subgroup with its own dynamics. What distinguishes these high R&D regions 
from the rest is primarily that R&D matters a lot in the former, while it is of little importance 
(or contributes negatively) in the latter. Also the tendency towards deindustrialization 
(negative impact of specialisation in industry) is much weaker among high R&D regions than 
for the others, indicating that high R&D industry is less affected by these negative trends than 
industry at large. These findings may serve as a warning against R&D euphoria in backward 
regions that lack the necessary infrastructure. Clearly, creating technological capabilities in 
backward regions demands much more than R&D, and it is an important task for future 
research to explore the interaction between the various factors that take part in these 
processes. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1.  The performance of regions in the US, Japan and Europe is analysed in a series of papers by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (see, among others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, 1996). 
For a more comprehensive treatment of the European case, see Neven and Goyotte (1995), 
Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) and Fagerberg, Verspagen and Caniëls (1997). 
2.  Some missing observations in the REGIO database have been collected from other publications or 
are estimates by the authors. 
3.  To make this measure comparable over time we divided regional GDP per capita by the mean 
value in the aggregate we look at (that is, EU9, EU12 or the individual country).  
4.  Molle (1980), a now classic study in this area, relies on so-called Theil-indices of GDP per capita. 
The Theil-index weights the regional per capita incomes using a measure of the size of the regions 
as weights. This implies that dispersion may change only because of changes in relative size and 
not because of changes in the dispersion of per capita incomes per se. A measure such as the 
standard deviation of the log of relative GDP per capita, used here and by many others, gives all 
regions the same weight independence of size. See also Dignan (1996). 
5.  This result is also born out in the EC (1996, p. 19) for a somewhat shorter period. 
6.  Note that the figures for Portugal between 1985 and 1990 reflect adjustments (shifts) in the data 
for certain regions. The hat-shaped curve that these adjustments give rise to is clearly a statistical 
artefact. What is of interest is the long-run trend. 
7.  For The Netherlands, the changes in oil (and gas) prices have influenced the incomes of Groningen 
so that the dispersion dropped dramatically from 1985 to 1987. 
8.  Italy stands out with the largest within-country dispersion, reflecting Italy’s well-known north–
south divide. For the other eight countries the internal dispersion as measured by the standard 
deviation of log per capita GDP (in PPP relative to the average) of each country is now between 
0.15 and 0.20 (1995). Hence, apart from Italy, there has been a convergence towards a common 
level of dispersion.  
9.  The hypothesis that technological catch-up requires substantial efforts and capabilities in the 
receiving country is discussed and tested in Fagerberg (1987,1988). Verspagen (1991) and Amable 
(1993) analyse the possibility that countries without the necessary assets may end up in a low-
growth trap. For an overview of empirical work on catch-up and growth, including its theoretical 
underpinnings, see Fagerberg (1994). 
10.  All data for the variables described below are taken from the EUROSTAT REGIO database. 
11.  Industry as used here includes fuel and power, manufacturing and construction. The remaining part 
of total employment when agriculture and industry are deducted is services, which therefore 
cannot be included as a separate variable. 
12.  Reverse causation cannot be excluded, of course, but previous research shows that the distribution 
of unemployment is roughly constant through time. Hence the high unemployment regions at the 
beginning of the period also had high unemployment at the end, and vice versa (Fagerberg, Caniëls 
and Verspagen, 1997). This seems to point to persistent social, institutional and economic 
problems in these regions that depress growth. 
13.  In the paper by Durlauf and Johnson (1992), and the article by Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996), 
the samples of j and n-j observations are subsequently subjected to the same splitting procedure on 
and on, until the number of degrees of freedom becomes too small to allow a new split, thus 
building so-called regression trees. In this chapter, we limit ourselves to just one split. 
14.  The variable was defined as the most southbound longitude that crosses a region. 
15.  It is possible that our measure of technological capability, R&D employment, is biased towards 
large firms in high R&D industries and countries, and fails to reflect the efforts by small firms, 
firms engaged in imitation, and industries in which learning – rather than organized R&D – 
dominates technological progress. This is in area where further research seems not only fruitful but 
absolutely necessary.  For an analysis of differences in modes of technological accumulation 
across industries, see Pavitt (1984, 1988). 
16.  For an analysis of regional policy in the EU, including its rationale and the need for reform, see 
Begg and Mayes (1993) and Begg (1997). 
17.  Note that funds disbursed to regions according to Objective 3 and 4 criteria are not regional 
specific in nature. But they may still have an allocation biased towards peripheral regions as high 
long- term unemployment and low rates of labour participation are quite typical features of such 
regions.  
18.  Note also that the high unemployment regions grow faster than any other subgroup included in 
Table 6.3.   14 
                                                 
19.  As mentioned the figures for Portugal between 1985 and 1990 reflect adjustments (shifts) in the 
data for certain regions. The hat-shaped curve that these adjustments give lead to is clearly a 
statistical artifact. 